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Single Idea 11134
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
]
Full Idea
When it comes to more reflexive judgements, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. Even children say that a dog surgically altered to look like a raccoon is still a dog.
Gist of Idea
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities
Source
E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.8
A Reaction
We can defend the theory by not underestimating people so much. Most categorisation is done on superficial grounds, but even children know there may be hidden similarities (behind the mask, under the bonnet) which are more important.
The
23 ideas
from 'Concepts'
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11120
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Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11122
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A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11121
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Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11124
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Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11123
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Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11125
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The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11128
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Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11130
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Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11129
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The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11131
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It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11132
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The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11133
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Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11134
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People don't just categorise by apparent similarities
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11135
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Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11136
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Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11137
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The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11138
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The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts?
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11139
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Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11140
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Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11141
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Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11142
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Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11146
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People can formulate new concepts which are only named later
[Margolis/Laurence]
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11147
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Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition
[Margolis/Laurence]
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