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Single Idea 11147

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis ]

Full Idea

Philosophers who oppose conceptual analysis identify their approach as being 'naturalistic'. Philosophy is supposed to be continuous with science, and philosophical theories are to be defended on explanatory grounds, not by a priori intuitions.

Gist of Idea

Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition

Source

E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 5.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.19

A Reaction

[They cite Papineau 1993, Devitt 1996 aand Kornblith 2002] I think there is a happy compromise here. I agree that any philosophical knowledge should be continuous with science, but we shouldn't prejudge how the analytic branch of science is done.

The 23 ideas from E Margolis/S Laurence

11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
11122 A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
11121 Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
11124 Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
11123 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
11125 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
11128 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
11130 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
11129 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
11131 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
11132 The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
11133 Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
11134 People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
11135 Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
11136 Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
11137 The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
11138 The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
11139 Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
11140 Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
11141 Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
11142 Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
11146 People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
11147 Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]