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Single Idea 11151

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence ]

Full Idea

One object depends upon another (in one sense of the term) if its essence prevents it from existing without the other object.

Gist of Idea

An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 2)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.2


A Reaction

I take the interest of this to be that essences are usually thought to be intrinsic, but this seems to involve the object in necessary external relations.


The 21 ideas from 'Essence and Modality'

Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]