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Single Idea 11161
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
]
Full Idea
We have an informal way of saying an object essentially has a property, as 'the object must have the property if it is to be the object that it is', and this form of words manages to convey what we wish to convey.
Gist of Idea
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is'
Source
Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 4)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.4
A Reaction
The importance of this claim is that it makes no mention of 'necessity'. Fine's view is plausible, but hard to evaluate once he has said. We seem to then divide an object's properties into identity properties, causal properties and peripheral properties.
The
21 ideas
from 'Essence and Modality'
16537
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Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties
[Fine,K, by Lowe]
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10935
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An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing
[Fine,K, by Rami]
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10936
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Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition'
[Fine,K, by Rami]
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11151
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An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object
[Fine,K]
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11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties
[Fine,K]
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11160
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Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object
[Fine,K]
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11158
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Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic
[Fine,K]
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11159
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My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis
[Fine,K]
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11157
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Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals
[Fine,K]
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11161
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Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is'
[Fine,K]
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11162
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Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence
[Fine,K]
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11163
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The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa
[Fine,K]
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11164
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It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold
[Fine,K]
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11165
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If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence
[Fine,K]
|
11166
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The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity
[Fine,K]
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11167
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Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa
[Fine,K]
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11168
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Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects
[Fine,K]
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11169
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Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts
[Fine,K]
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11170
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Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms
[Fine,K]
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11171
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Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same
[Fine,K]
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11172
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The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man'
[Fine,K]
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