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Single Idea 11162

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

It is necessary that Socrates and the Eiffel Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower, for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.

Gist of Idea

Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.5

A Reaction

I find this simple argument very persuasive in separating out necessary facts about an object from the essence of that object.

The 21 ideas from 'Essence and Modality'

16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]