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Single Idea 11163

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities ]

Full Idea

Can we not recognise a sense of 'what an object is', according to which it lies in the nature of a singleton to have Socrates as a member, even though it does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the singleton?

Clarification

A 'singleton' is a set with a unique member

Gist of Idea

The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 5)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.5

A Reaction

Important and persuasive. It echoes the example in Idea 11162, that the necessary relation is not part of the essence. Socrates is necessarily in {Socrates}, but that is because of the set, not because of Socrates. Essences causes necessities.

Related Idea

Idea 11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]

The 22 ideas with the same theme [essence is different from necessary properties]:

12262 An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
17246 Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
17191 Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
13082 The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
13189 A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
11993 Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
11918 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
13376 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
12870 We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
11248 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
13166 Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
16749 Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]