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Full Idea
Conceptual (and logical) necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts (or just the logical concepts).
Gist of Idea
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts
Source
Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9-10)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.9
A Reaction
The idea that something might be true simply because of the nature of a concept sounds good, and a slightly better formulation than traditional accounts of analytic truth.
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |