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Single Idea 11171

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence ]

Full Idea

There is an analogy between defining a term and giving the essence of an object. ..However, I am inclined to think that the two cases are not merely parallel but are, at bottom, the same.

Gist of Idea

Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same

Source

Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p.13)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.13

A Reaction

The proposal is something like the meaning of a concept being the essence of the concept. And essence is definition. The parallel is that they both lead to necessities, either derived from objects or from concepts. Sounds good to me.

The 21 ideas from 'Essence and Modality'

16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]