more on this theme     |     more from this text


Single Idea 11183

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds ]

Full Idea

The usefulness of talk about possible worlds is not for purposes of individuating the object - that can be done in this world; such talk is a way of sorting its properties.

Gist of Idea

The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects)

Source

Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.192)

Book Ref

-: 'Nous' [-], p.192


A Reaction

'Possible worlds are a device for sorting properties' sounds to me like a promising slogan. Ruth Marcus originated rigid designation, before Kripke came up with the label.


The 22 ideas from Ruth Barcan Marcus

Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]