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Single Idea 11192

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

Putnam takes causes to be the essence of disease kinds, and they are distinct from the diseases they cause, both in identity and in proper parthood. These are relational properties, so Putnam gives examples of natural kinds with relational essences.

Gist of Idea

If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence

Source

report of Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Neil E. Williams - Putnam's Traditional Neo-Essentialism §4

Book Ref

-: 'The Philosophical Quarterly' [-], p.16


A Reaction

This seems to be a nice point, since scientific essentialism invariable takes itself to be pursuing instrinsic properties when it unravels the essences of natural kinds. Probably the best response is the Putnam has got muddled.


The 9 ideas from 'The Meaning of 'Meaning''

Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]