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Single Idea 11201

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes ]

Full Idea

Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus.

Gist of Idea

Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject

Source

Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)

Book Ref

Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.93

A Reaction

These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [properties as simply ways of existing]:

10947 Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
16644 The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
14044 The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
14045 Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
16645 Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
16643 Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
16641 Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas]
16665 There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
16666 A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
16668 Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
16730 If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
16670 Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
17171 A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza]
16669 Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
18353 Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
16662 The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]