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Single Idea 11203

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

Specific essence differs from generic essence by being demarcated: individuals are demarcated within species by dimensionally defined material, but species within genus by a defining differentiation taken from the form.

Gist of Idea

Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form

Source

Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.95)

Book Ref

Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.95

A Reaction

It clearly won't be enough to define an individual just to define its material and its shape. The material might also be essential to the genus, as when defining fire. Probably not very helpful.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

11237 Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
12099 Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
16038 Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
5444 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
15681 Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]