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Full Idea
Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity.
Gist of Idea
If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity
Source
Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2
A Reaction
We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts.
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |