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Full Idea
Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language).
Gist of Idea
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive
Source
Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.9
16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |