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Single Idea 11225
[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
]
Full Idea
In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds
Source
Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.12
The
12 ideas
from 'Definitions'
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11215
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Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski)
[Gupta]
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11216
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If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity
[Gupta]
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11217
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Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage
[Gupta]
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11220
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Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable
[Gupta]
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11218
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Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings
[Gupta]
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11221
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A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate
[Gupta]
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11222
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The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning
[Gupta]
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11223
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Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens'
[Gupta]
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11224
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Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive
[Gupta]
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11226
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Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability
[Gupta]
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11225
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A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds
[Gupta]
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11227
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The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output
[Gupta]
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