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Single Idea 11243

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us).

Gist of Idea

Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions

Source

report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1

Book Ref

Politis,Vasilis: 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics' [Routledge 2004], p.27


A Reaction

There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century.

Related Idea

Idea 9067 Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]