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Single Idea 11255

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object ]

Full Idea

There is a fundamental distinction between feature-change and generation. ..Materials such as bronze cannot by themselves explain why they are the particular material things they are. But matter which generates things does not endure.

Gist of Idea

In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't

Source

report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4

Book Ref

Politis,Vasilis: 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics' [Routledge 2004], p.60


A Reaction

This very nice distinction is rather undermined by our modern understanding of generation, but it still might work at a lower level. Transmuting an element by bombarding it is different from reshaping the stuff.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [underlying material which is formed into an object]:

Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]