more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 11292

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition ]

Full Idea

A what-it-was to-be-that-thing only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition.

Gist of Idea

Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a06)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.179

A Reaction

That seems to be that 'to ti en einai' (aka essence) only has a 'logos' if it has a 'horismos'. It seems that having a definition as its account is a necessary condition for an essence, but not sufficient. It looks to me as if essence must be explanatory.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:

21259 To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
10963 A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
11292 Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
11287 Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
12091 If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
12146 Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
17865 Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]