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Single Idea 11838

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

The thesis of Relativity of Identity (which I steadfastly oppose) ..suggests that it makes all the difference to keeping track of continuants through space and time which concept one subsumes something under.

Gist of Idea

Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 1.1)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.22

A Reaction

[Geach I take to be the villain of this idea] The point is that identity is entirely relative to the sortal concept, where Wiggins wants to make identity a combination of the object itself and our concept of it (I think).

The 18 ideas with the same theme [identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:

16794 As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
12153 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]