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Single Idea 11847

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

As a necessary condition of the truth of an identity claim, some common sort f will have to be found to which they each belong. That is the point at which the primary question of identity can come into focus.

Gist of Idea

To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.2)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.58

A Reaction

This is the plainest English expression I can find of Wiggins's main thesis. He maintains this thesis, while adamantly denying the idea that identity consists entirely of falling under a concept.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:

16794 As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
12153 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]