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Single Idea 11847
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
]
Full Idea
As a necessary condition of the truth of an identity claim, some common sort f will have to be found to which they each belong. That is the point at which the primary question of identity can come into focus.
Gist of Idea
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
Source
David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.2)
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.58
A Reaction
This is the plainest English expression I can find of Wiggins's main thesis. He maintains this thesis, while adamantly denying the idea that identity consists entirely of falling under a concept.
The
39 ideas
from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'
14746
|
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal
[Sider on Wiggins]
|
11900
|
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
[Mackie,P on Wiggins]
|
11896
|
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
15835
|
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
10679
|
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
[Wiggins, by Hossack]
|
14363
|
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14364
|
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14749
|
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14744
|
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14362
|
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
11831
|
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11832
|
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
[Wiggins]
|
11836
|
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
[Wiggins]
|
11838
|
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
[Wiggins]
|
11839
|
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
[Wiggins]
|
11848
|
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
[Wiggins]
|
11847
|
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
[Wiggins]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11841
|
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
[Wiggins]
|
11850
|
Not every story corresponds to a possible world
[Wiggins]
|
11844
|
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
[Wiggins]
|
11851
|
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
[Wiggins]
|
11852
|
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
[Wiggins]
|
11845
|
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11858
|
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
[Wiggins]
|
11859
|
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
[Wiggins]
|
11860
|
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds
[Wiggins]
|
11869
|
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
[Wiggins]
|
11870
|
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
[Wiggins]
|
11863
|
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
[Wiggins]
|
11861
|
We can forget about individual or particularized essences
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
11865
|
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
[Wiggins]
|
11866
|
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
[Wiggins]
|
11871
|
Essences are not explanations, but individuations
[Wiggins]
|
11875
|
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
[Wiggins]
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11876
|
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
[Wiggins]
|
11879
|
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F)
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
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11835
|
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
[Wiggins]
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