more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 11864
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
The simple proof (from Ruth Barcan Marcus) is: Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus, so if Phosphorus is Hesperus, then Phosphorus is necessarily Hesperus.
Gist of Idea
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
Source
David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.3)
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.116
A Reaction
This is the famous idea which she noticed well before Kripke. The point is that the simple logic of the case bestows a necessity on the identity. We shouldn't be confused by the a posteriori and contingent nature of the discovery.
The
39 ideas
from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'
14746
|
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal
[Sider on Wiggins]
|
11900
|
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
[Mackie,P on Wiggins]
|
11896
|
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
15835
|
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
10679
|
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
[Wiggins, by Hossack]
|
14363
|
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14364
|
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14749
|
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14744
|
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14362
|
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
11831
|
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11832
|
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
[Wiggins]
|
11836
|
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
[Wiggins]
|
11838
|
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
[Wiggins]
|
11839
|
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
[Wiggins]
|
11847
|
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
[Wiggins]
|
11848
|
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
[Wiggins]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11841
|
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
[Wiggins]
|
11850
|
Not every story corresponds to a possible world
[Wiggins]
|
11844
|
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
[Wiggins]
|
11851
|
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
[Wiggins]
|
11852
|
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
[Wiggins]
|
11845
|
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11858
|
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
[Wiggins]
|
11859
|
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
[Wiggins]
|
11860
|
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds
[Wiggins]
|
11869
|
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
[Wiggins]
|
11870
|
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
[Wiggins]
|
11863
|
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
[Wiggins]
|
11861
|
We can forget about individual or particularized essences
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
11865
|
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
[Wiggins]
|
11866
|
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
[Wiggins]
|
11871
|
Essences are not explanations, but individuations
[Wiggins]
|
11875
|
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
[Wiggins]
|
11876
|
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
[Wiggins]
|
11879
|
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F)
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
11835
|
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
[Wiggins]
|