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Single Idea 11865

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

A thing could have a property only if its having the property could be conceived, and that requires some sortal concept which adequately answers the Aristotelian question what the thing is.

Gist of Idea

The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.5)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.121

A Reaction

[Algebra omitted!] The core idea of Wiggins's theory. It seems at first glance to be a revival of Aristotelian essentialism, but his view of that seems to merely involve falling into a category. He treats sortal concepts as Aristotle's 'primary being'.

The 40 ideas with the same theme [picking out things by giving their kind]:

12351 Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
16156 Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
12280 Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
12529 I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
15834 Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
13868 Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
14745 If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
12860 Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]