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Single Idea 11868
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
]
Full Idea
Could the artificer not, when he made the table, have taken other pieces? Surely he could. [n37: I venture to think that Kripke's argument in note 56 for the necessity of constitution depends on treating constitution as if it were identity].
Gist of Idea
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity
Source
comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 56) by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 4.11
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.134
A Reaction
Suppose the craftsman completed the table, then changed a piece of wood in it for some reason. Has he now made a second table and destroyed the first one? Wiggins seems to be right.
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[objects should be understood as what they are made of]:
16066
|
Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person
[Epicharmus]
|
6019
|
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist
[Mnesarchus]
|
16995
|
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
[Kripke]
|
17047
|
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
[Kripke]
|
11868
|
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity
[Wiggins on Kripke]
|
14264
|
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical?
[Fine,K]
|
14267
|
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends
[Fine,K]
|
16076
|
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows
[Rudder Baker]
|
16081
|
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc
[Rudder Baker]
|
16082
|
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps
[Rudder Baker]
|
16228
|
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place
[Hawley]
|
16229
|
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
[Hawley]
|
14492
|
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?
[Hawley]
|
15848
|
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality
[Harte,V]
|
6130
|
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
[Merricks]
|
6138
|
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
[Merricks]
|
12867
|
A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand
[Simons]
|
13279
|
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
[Koslicki]
|
16065
|
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities)
[Wasserman]
|
16067
|
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation
[Wasserman]
|
16069
|
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity
[Wasserman]
|