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Full Idea
Worlds are the shadows of our suppositions and they take on their identity from these. Suppositions take on their identity from (inter alia) the objects they relate to. If they sever themselves from these objects, then they collapse.
Clarification
'Inter alia' means among other things
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
Source
David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.11)
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.136
A Reaction
Sounds good. My picture is of possibilities which are suggested by objecfs in the actual world, with extreme possibilities being at fifth-remove from actuality. Any worlds that go beyond natural possibility are just there for fun.
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |