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Full Idea
You assert that the notion of substance is formed from concepts, and not from things. But are not concepts themselves formed from things?
Gist of Idea
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.06.23), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 5.7
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.154
A Reaction
A nice remark, which is true even of highly abstruse, abstract or fanciful concepts. You are still left with the question of how far away from reality you have moved when you construct things from your reality-based concepts.
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |