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Full Idea
The view standardly attributed to Leibniz, that makes all an individual's properties essential to it should be regarded as an extreme version of essentialism, not a denial of essentialism.
Gist of Idea
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial
Source
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.1
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.1
A Reaction
Wiggins disagrees, saying that Leibniz was not an essentialist, which is an interesting topic of research for those who are interested. I would take Leibniz to be not an essentialist, on that basis, as essentialism makes a distinction. See Quine on that.
Related Idea
Idea 11862 Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]