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Single Idea 11883
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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Full Idea
Socrates can be assigned a haecceity: an essential property of 'being Socrates' which (unlike the property of 'being identical with Socrates') may be regarded as what 'makes' its possessor Socrates in a non-trivial sense, but is simple and unanalysable.
Clarification
Pronounced 'hex-ey-ety'
Gist of Idea
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
Source
Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.2)
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.21
A Reaction
I don't accept that there is any such property as 'being Socrates' (or even 'being identical with Socrates'), except as empty locutions or logical devices. A haecceity seems to be the 'ultimate subject of predication', with no predicates of its own.
The
18 ideas
from Penelope Mackie
11877
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An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
[Mackie,P]
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11906
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The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
[Mackie,P]
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11905
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Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
[Mackie,P]
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11909
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Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
[Mackie,P]
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11907
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Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not
[Mackie,P]
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11882
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No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
[Mackie,P]
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11883
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A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
[Mackie,P]
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11884
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The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
[Mackie,P]
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11886
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There are problems both with individual essences and without them
[Mackie,P]
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11887
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Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
[Mackie,P]
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11889
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Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
[Mackie,P]
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11890
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De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
[Mackie,P]
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11892
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Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
[Mackie,P]
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11893
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Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
[Mackie,P]
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11894
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Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
[Mackie,P]
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11897
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A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
[Mackie,P]
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11898
|
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
[Mackie,P]
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11899
|
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
[Mackie,P]
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