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Single Idea 11889

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects ]

Full Idea

The argument for unshareable properties (the Reduplication Argument) suggests the danger of reduplication of Berkeley; the argument for incompatible properties (Multiple Occupancy) says Berkeley and Hume could be in the same possible object.

Gist of Idea

Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences

Source

Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.8)

Book Ref

Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.34

A Reaction

These are her arguments in favour of essential properties being necessarily incompatible between objects. Whatever the answer, it must allow essences for indistinguishables like electrons. 'Incompatible' points towards a haecceity.

The 18 ideas from Penelope Mackie

11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]