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Single Idea 11890
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
]
Full Idea
Anyone who wishes to avoid both bare identities and individual essences, without abandoning de re modality entirely, must adopt counterpart theory.
Clarification
De re modality concerns the possibilities in real things
Gist of Idea
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
Source
Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 4.1)
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.71
A Reaction
This at least means that Lewis's proposal has an important place in the discussion, forcing us to think more clearly about the identities involved when we talk of possibilities. Mackie herself votes for bare indentities.
The
18 ideas
from 'How Things Might Have Been'
11877
|
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
[Mackie,P]
|
11906
|
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
[Mackie,P]
|
11905
|
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
[Mackie,P]
|
11909
|
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
[Mackie,P]
|
11907
|
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not
[Mackie,P]
|
11882
|
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
[Mackie,P]
|
11883
|
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
[Mackie,P]
|
11884
|
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
[Mackie,P]
|
11886
|
There are problems both with individual essences and without them
[Mackie,P]
|
11887
|
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
[Mackie,P]
|
11889
|
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
[Mackie,P]
|
11890
|
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
[Mackie,P]
|
11892
|
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
[Mackie,P]
|
11893
|
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
[Mackie,P]
|
11894
|
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
[Mackie,P]
|
11897
|
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
[Mackie,P]
|
11898
|
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
[Mackie,P]
|
11899
|
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
[Mackie,P]
|