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Single Idea 11897

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation ]

Full Idea

One view of a principle of individuation is what is called a 'criterion of identity', determining answers to questions about identity and distinctness at a time and over time - a principle of distinction and persistence.

Gist of Idea

A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time

Source

Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 8.2)

Book Ref

Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.134

A Reaction

Since the term 'Prime Minister' might do this job, presumably there could be a de dicto as well as a de re version of individuation. The distinctness consists of chairing cabinet meetings, rather than being of a particular sex.

The 18 ideas from Penelope Mackie

11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]