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Full Idea
We might agree with Wiggins's theory of individuation, but reject his thesis that a thing's principle of individuation (of distinctness and persistence) must be preserved in all counterfactual situations.
Gist of Idea
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
Source
comment on David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 8.7
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.149
A Reaction
I'm not even convinced that initial individuation consists of falling under a sortal, and I prefer to discuss the powers of the thing, rather than counterfactual facts about behaviour.