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Single Idea 11908
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
]
Full Idea
The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap.
Gist of Idea
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties
Source
comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.180
A Reaction
[This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them.
The
27 ideas
with the same theme
[essence as belonging to a particular natural kind]:
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11188
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The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object
[Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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11196
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Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories
[Aquinas]
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13074
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Only natural kinds and their members have real essences
[Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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17233
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Particulars contain universal things
[Hobbes]
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12530
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The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing
[Locke]
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12532
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Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties
[Locke]
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12539
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If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences
[Locke]
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21218
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The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos
[Husserl]
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15106
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Essence is expressed by grammar
[Wittgenstein]
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11908
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Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties
[Mackie,P on Putnam]
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12679
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A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties
[Ellis]
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17055
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Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
[Kripke]
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals
[Ayers]
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15143
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Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers
[Bhaskar, by Chakravartty]
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11895
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A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed
[Brody, by Mackie,P]
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12141
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Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind?
[Brody]
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16509
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Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances
[Wiggins]
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12013
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Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
[Forbes,G]
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15678
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Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity
[Gelman]
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15683
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Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first
[Gelman]
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15697
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Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories
[Gelman]
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12871
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Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are
[Simons]
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13129
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Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories
[Westerhoff]
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11909
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Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
[Mackie,P]
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11899
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Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
[Mackie,P]
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15145
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A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class
[Chakravartty]
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10939
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'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
[Rami]
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