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Full Idea
The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap.
Gist of Idea
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties
Source
comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.180
A Reaction
[This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them.
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |