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Full Idea
"The same" is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean "the same X", where X represents a general term. ...There is no such thing as being just 'the same'.
Gist of Idea
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X'
Source
Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §16)
Book Ref
Geach,Peter: 'Mental Acts: Their content and their objects' [RKP 1971], p.69
A Reaction
Geach seems oddly unaware of the perfect identity of Hespherus with Phosphorus. His critics don't spot that he was concerned with identity over time (of 'the same man', who ages). Perry's critique emphasises the type/token distinction.
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
| 16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
| 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |