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Single Idea 11931
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
]
Full Idea
We know that all energy fields are discontinuous below the distance measured by Planck's constant h. The physical world ultimately consists of discrete objects.
Gist of Idea
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small
Source
George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2.2)
Book Ref
Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.53
A Reaction
This is where quantum theory clashes with relativity, since the latter holds space to be a continuum. I'm not sure about Molnar's use of the word 'objects' here.
The
38 ideas
from 'Powers'
11912
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Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means
[Molnar]
|
11914
|
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding
[Molnar]
|
11913
|
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts
[Molnar]
|
11915
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If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties
[Molnar]
|
11916
|
'Being physical' is a second-order property
[Molnar]
|
11917
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Structural properties are derivate properties
[Molnar]
|
11918
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The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it
[Molnar]
|
11919
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Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection
[Molnar]
|
11920
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A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
[Molnar]
|
11927
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Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic
[Molnar]
|
11921
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The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round
[Molnar]
|
11928
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Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
[Molnar]
|
11956
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'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
[Molnar]
|
11957
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It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world
[Molnar]
|
11959
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Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true
[Molnar]
|
11960
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Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization
[Molnar]
|
11961
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Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
[Molnar]
|
11962
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Nominalists only accept first-order logic
[Molnar]
|
11963
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What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible?
[Molnar]
|
9448
|
Location in space and time are non-power properties
[Molnar, by Mumford]
|
11929
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The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations
[Molnar]
|
11930
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One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others
[Molnar]
|
11931
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Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small
[Molnar]
|
11932
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Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity
[Molnar]
|
11933
|
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation
[Molnar]
|
11934
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The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
[Molnar]
|
11935
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Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
[Molnar]
|
11936
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The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness
[Molnar]
|
11937
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We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
[Molnar]
|
11939
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If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers
[Molnar]
|
11943
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Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world
[Molnar]
|
11944
|
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles
[Molnar]
|
11947
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Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
[Molnar]
|
11951
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Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
[Molnar]
|
11952
|
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
[Molnar]
|
11953
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Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
[Molnar]
|
11954
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We should analyse causation in terms of powers
[Molnar]
|
11955
|
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts
[Molnar]
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