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Single Idea 11936

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind ]

Full Idea

There have only been two serious proposals for distinguishing mind from matter. One appeals to intentionality, as per Brentano and his medieval precursors. The other, harking back to Descartes, Locke and empiricism, uses the capacity for consciousness.

Gist of Idea

The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.5.3)

Book Ref

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.71


A Reaction

Personally I take both of these to be reducible, and hence have no place for 'minds' in my ontology. Focusing on Chalmers's 'Hard Question' was the shift from the intentionality view to the consciousness view which is now more popular.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the mind]:

Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras]
The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza]
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]