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Single Idea 11937
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
]
Full Idea
Causal analyses of powers pre-empt the correct account of causation in terms of powers.
Gist of Idea
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
Source
George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.2.3)
Book Ref
Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.93
A Reaction
I think this is my preferred view. The crucial point is that powers are active, so one is not needing to add some weird 'causation' ingredient to a world which would otherwise be passive and inert. That is a relic from the interventions of God.
The
38 ideas
from George Molnar
11912
|
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means
[Molnar]
|
11914
|
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding
[Molnar]
|
11913
|
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts
[Molnar]
|
11915
|
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties
[Molnar]
|
11916
|
'Being physical' is a second-order property
[Molnar]
|
11917
|
Structural properties are derivate properties
[Molnar]
|
11918
|
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it
[Molnar]
|
11920
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A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
[Molnar]
|
11919
|
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection
[Molnar]
|
11927
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Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic
[Molnar]
|
11921
|
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round
[Molnar]
|
11928
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Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
[Molnar]
|
11956
|
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
[Molnar]
|
11957
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It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world
[Molnar]
|
11959
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Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true
[Molnar]
|
11961
|
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
[Molnar]
|
11960
|
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization
[Molnar]
|
11963
|
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible?
[Molnar]
|
11962
|
Nominalists only accept first-order logic
[Molnar]
|
9448
|
Location in space and time are non-power properties
[Molnar, by Mumford]
|
11929
|
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations
[Molnar]
|
11930
|
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others
[Molnar]
|
11931
|
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small
[Molnar]
|
11932
|
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity
[Molnar]
|
11933
|
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation
[Molnar]
|
11934
|
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
[Molnar]
|
11935
|
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
[Molnar]
|
11936
|
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness
[Molnar]
|
11937
|
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
[Molnar]
|
11939
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If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers
[Molnar]
|
11943
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Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world
[Molnar]
|
11944
|
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles
[Molnar]
|
11947
|
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
[Molnar]
|
11951
|
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
[Molnar]
|
11952
|
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
[Molnar]
|
11953
|
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
[Molnar]
|
11954
|
We should analyse causation in terms of powers
[Molnar]
|
11955
|
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts
[Molnar]
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