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Single Idea 11939

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers ]

Full Idea

Two arguments against Megaran Actualism are that it turns powers into nomads: they come and go, depending on whether they are being exercised or not. And it stops us from distinguishing between unexercised powers and absent powers.

Gist of Idea

If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.3.1)

Book Ref

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.97


A Reaction

See Idea 11938 for Megaran Actualism. Molnar takes these objections to be fairly decisive, but if the Megarans are denying the existence of latent powers, they aren't going to be bothered by nomadism or the lack of distinction.

Related Idea

Idea 11938 The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [relation of dispositions to underlying active powers]:

There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum]
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]