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Single Idea 11943

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

Dispositions can be causes. What is not actual cannot be a cause or any part of a cause. Merely possible events are not actual, and that makes them causally impotent. The claim that powers are causally potent has strong initial plausibility.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 5)

Book Ref

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.101


A Reaction

[He credits Mellor 1974 for this idea] He will need to show how dispositions can be causes (other than, presumably, being anticipated or imagined by conscious minds), which he says he will do in Ch. 12.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]