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Single Idea 11946
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
]
Full Idea
Propensities should not be regarded as inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but should be regarded as inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was part).
Gist of Idea
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
Source
Karl Popper (A World of Propensities [1993], p.14), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 6.2
Book Ref
Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.106
A Reaction
Molnar argues against this claim, and I agree with him. We can see why Popper might prefer this relational view, given that powers often only become apparent in unusual relational situations.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:
15983
|
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure
[Locke, by Alexander,P]
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13602
|
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
[Hume]
|
11950
|
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them
[Hume]
|
11941
|
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous
[Hume]
|
17772
|
Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic
[Kant, by Bayne]
|
14300
|
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
[Ryle]
|
11946
|
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
[Popper]
|
18397
|
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14328
|
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14331
|
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14582
|
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
19014
|
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
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