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Single Idea 11961

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation ]

Full Idea

The counterfactual analysis is open to the Euthyphro objection: it is causal dependence that explains any counterfactual dependence rather than vice versa.

Clarification

See Idea 336 for the Euthyphro objection (i.e. which comes first?)

Gist of Idea

Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1)

Book Ref

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.187

A Reaction

I take views like the counterfactual analysis of causation to arise from empiricists who are bizarrely reluctant to adopt plausible best explainations (such as powers and essences).

Related Idea

Idea 336 Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato]

The 38 ideas from George Molnar

11912 Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
11914 Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
11913 For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
11915 If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
11916 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
11917 Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
11918 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
11919 Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
11920 A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
11927 Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
11921 The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
11928 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
11957 It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
11959 Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
11960 Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
11961 Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
11962 Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
11963 What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
9448 Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
11929 The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
11930 One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
11931 Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
11932 Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
11933 A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
11934 The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
11935 Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
11936 The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
11937 We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
11939 If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
11943 Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
11944 Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
11947 Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
11951 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
11952 The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
11953 Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
11954 We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
11955 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]