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Full Idea
If we adopt the bare particular metaphysical view, we have a simple solution to the transworld identification problem: we identify by bare particulars.
Gist of Idea
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars
Source
David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.98)
Book Ref
'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.98
A Reaction
See Ideas 11969 and 11970 on this idea. The problem with bare particulars is that they can change their properties utterly, so that Aristotle in the actual world can be a poached egg in some possible world. We need essences.
Related Ideas
Idea 11969 Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
Idea 11970 Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
Idea 11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
| 11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
| 9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
| 11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |