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Full Idea
Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you.
Gist of Idea
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
Source
David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' [OUP 1983], p.28
A Reaction
It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow.
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |