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Single Idea 11975

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.

Gist of Idea

If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart

Source

David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' [OUP 1983], p.29


A Reaction

This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom.


The 31 ideas with the same theme [there are only closely resembling possible entities]:

Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]