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Single Idea 11975

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.

Gist of Idea

If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart

Source

David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' [OUP 1983], p.29


A Reaction

This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom.


The 7 ideas from 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic'

Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]