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Single Idea 12010

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and ]

Full Idea

The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules.

Gist of Idea

Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?

Source

Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4)

Book Ref

Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.82

The 7 ideas with the same theme [role of 'and' in systems of logic]:

16967 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
17895 Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]