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Full Idea
The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules.
Gist of Idea
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
Source
Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4)
Book Ref
Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.82
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |