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Single Idea 12014
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
]
Full Idea
An individual essence of an object x is a set of properties I which satisfies the following conditions: i. every property P in I is an essential property of x; ii. it is not possible that some object y distinct from x has every member of I.
Gist of Idea
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
Source
Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)
Book Ref
Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.99
A Reaction
I am coming to the view that stable natural kinds (like electrons or gold) do not have individual essences, but complex kinds (like tigers or tables) do. The view is based on the idea that explanatory power is what individuates an essence.
The
25 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Modality'
11885
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Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
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11888
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Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
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12003
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De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities
[Forbes,G]
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12004
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Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
[Forbes,G]
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12005
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The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)'
[Forbes,G]
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12008
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Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them
[Forbes,G]
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12009
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The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects
[Forbes,G]
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12007
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Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
[Forbes,G]
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12010
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Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
[Forbes,G]
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12014
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An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
[Forbes,G]
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12015
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Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational
[Forbes,G]
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12013
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Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
[Forbes,G]
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12012
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Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist
[Forbes,G]
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12011
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Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
[Forbes,G]
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12016
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The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
[Forbes,G]
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12017
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In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity
[Forbes,G]
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12020
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An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin
[Forbes,G]
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12021
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Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness
[Forbes,G]
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12022
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Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact
[Forbes,G]
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12023
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Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages
[Forbes,G]
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12024
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If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
[Forbes,G]
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12025
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Artefacts have fuzzy essences
[Forbes,G]
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12027
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There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory
[Forbes,G]
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12028
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De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is
[Forbes,G]
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12029
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We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual
[Forbes,G]
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