more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12015

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

A non-trivial individual essence is properties other than a) those following from a de dicto truth, b) properties of existence and self-identity (or their cognates), c) properties derived from necessities in some other category.

Gist of Idea

Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational

Source

Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1)

Book Ref

Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.99


A Reaction

[I have compressed Forbes] Rather than adding all these qualificational clauses to our concept, we could just tighten up on the notion of a property, saying it is something which is causally efficacious, and hence explanatory.


The 40 ideas with the same theme [each individual has its own distinct essence]:

Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]